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Abstract 
We show that bank lending standards are influenced by macroeconomic conditions. We use 
monthly data from the Banco de España Central Credit Register, which allow us to monitor all 
loan applications made by non-financial firms to non-current banks from 2002 to 2015. To 
test the pro-cyclicality of banks’ appetite for risk, we investigate how two firm characteristics 
(ex-ante credit risk and productivity) interacting with two macroeconomic indicators (business 
cycle and the monetary policy stance) affect the probability of granting a loan. In order to 
enhance identification we account for unobserved heterogeneity by means of firm and bank-
time fixed effects. Our findings indicate that banks soften their credit standards during booms 
or when monetary policy is loose to harden them during busts or when short-term interest 
rates increase. This pattern is especially relevant in the case of firms’ productivity, which might 
partly explain the dismal evolution of aggregate productivity in Spain during the pre-crisis 
period. Finally, we also find that these results are more pronounced among less capitalized, 
less liquid and more profitable banks. 
Keywords: productivity, credit risk, bank supply, lending standards. 






En este trabajo mostramos que los estándares de concesión de préstamos por parte de los 
bancos se ven afectados por las condiciones macroeconómicas. Utilizamos datos mensuales 
entre 2002 y 2015 de la Central de Información de Riesgos del Banco de España (CIRBE), 
que nos permiten monitorear todas las solicitudes de préstamos realizadas por empresas no 
financieras a bancos con los que no tienen relación crediticia previa. Con el objetivo de 
analizar la prociclicalidad del apetito por el riesgo de los bancos, investigamos cómo 
la probabilidad de otorgar un préstamo cambia en función de dos características de las 
empresas (riesgo de crédito ex ante y productividad) y cómo esta relación varía a lo largo del 
ciclo económico, que medimos mediante el crecimiento del PIB y los cambios en tipos 
de interés. Nuestra estrategia de identificación se basa en la inclusión de efectos fijos de 
empresa y banco-mes en nuestras regresiones, de modo que explotamos diferencias en la 
concesión de préstamos del mismo banco en el mismo mes a empresas que son diferentes 
en términos de productividad y riesgo de crédito. Nuestros resultados indican que los bancos 
relajan sus estándares de crédito en momentos de expansión económica y/o de caídas de 
tipos de interés, y los endurecen durante la fase recesiva y/o cuando aumentan los tipos 
de interés. Este patrón es especialmente relevante en el caso de la productividad de las 
empresas, lo que podría explicar en parte la caída de la productividad agregada en España 
durante el período expansivo previo a la crisis. Finalmente, también encontramos que estos 
patrones cíclicos son más pronunciados entre los bancos menos capitalizados, menos 
líquidos y más rentables. 
Palabras clave: productividad, riesgo de crédito, oferta de crédito, estándares crediticios. 
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1 Introduction 
The recent financial crisis lived by the Western economies in general and by Spain in particular 
has once again revived the interest on the behaviour of banks during lending booms. It is well 
rooted that banks soften their lending standards during times of strong economic growth or 
expansionary monetary policy periods, to tighten them during busts. While the importance of 
short-term interest rates on banks risk-taking has been widely studied in the empirical literature 
in recent years (Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró & Saurina, 2014; (Dell’Ariccia, Laeven & Suarez, 
2013; (Becker & Ivashina, 2015; (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; (Di Maggio & Kacperczyk, 2017) the 
literature on the link between economic cycle and the appetite for risk of banks is scarce 
(Rodano, Serrano Velarde, & Tarantino, 2017).  
Our study investigates how bank lending standards are affected by firms’ ex-ante 
creditworthiness, proxied by ex-ante credit risk and productivity, and how this pattern depends 
not only on the monetary policy stance and the economic cycle, but also on the balance-sheet 
strength of banks. In this sense, the importance of the firm balance-sheet channel in terms of 
ex-ante credit risk is well documented in the literature (see, for instance, (Rodano, Serrano-
Velarde, & Tarantino, 2017; and (Jiménez, et al., 2014), but we know little about the role of 
productivity differences across firms in the allocation of credit depending on the banks’ 
balance-sheet strength. Indeed, although there is a strong correlation between bank credit and 
aggregate productivity growth in Spain (see Figure 1), the link between bank lending standards 
and productivity, however, is not well understood yet. Our findings indicate that banks soften 
their lending standards during expansionary times, in terms of firms’ productivity and ex-ante 
credit risk, and especially among lowly capitalized, less liquid and more profitable banks. This 
pattern might partly explain the misallocation of resources towards low-productivity and risky 
firms which is at the root of the dismal evolution of aggregate productivity during the Spanish 
boom as documentd in (García-Santana, Moral-Benito, Pijoan-Mas and Ramos (2016).  
There is a vast strand of literature that highlights the importance of lending standards 
to understand the economic fluctuations and the dynamics of credit over the business cycle 
(Greenwood & Hanson, 2013; (Lopez-Salido & Zakrajsek, 2015; (Covas & Den Haan, 2011; 
(Jermann & Quadrini, 2012; (Becker & Ivashina, 2014; (Gilchrist, Yankov, & Zakrajsek, 2009), 
and there are different theories that provide a rationale for the mechanisms that make creditors 
vary their lending standards and their perception of credit risk over the cycle: agency problems 
(Williamson, 1963), herd behavior (Rajan, 1994), institutional memory hypothesis (Berger & 
Udell, 2004) and disaster myopia (Guttentag & Herring, 1986). Furthermore on the empirical 
front, there is evidence in the literature that contractive monetary policies and bad economic 
conditions affect lending standards and reduce banks’ credit supply Jiménez et al. 2012; 
(Dell'Ariccia, Laeven, & Suarez, 2017; (Dell'Ariccia & Marquez, 2006; (Saurina & Jimenez, 2006; 
(Ozlem, García Montalvo, García Villar, Peydró, & Maria Raya, 2014). Moreover, banks that are 
less capitalized, less liquid, and small are also those adjusting more pro cyclically their credit 
risk portfolio levels Rodano et al, 2017; (Kashyap & Jeremy, 2000; (Jiménez et al, 2014; 
(Bedayo, Estrada, & Saurina, 2017). 
Turning to the demand side (balance-sheet strength of firms), a credit contraction 
affects firms heterogeneously on the basis of their characteristics implying changes in the 
allocation of funds across firms and the composition of banks’ loans portfolios (Jiménez, 
Ongena, & Peydró, 2017). Indeed, the ability of banks to discriminate in terms of firms’ 
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productivity when granting new loans might wave in the end the allocation of resources and 
shape productivity, real activity and economic growth; (Borio, Kharroubi, Upper, & Zampolli, 
(2015) show that lax credit conditions lead to misallocation of resources and productivity 
losses; while Rodano, et al. (2017) show that substandard firms excluded from access to credit 
during busts (because banks’ cyclical adjustment of lending standards) report lower values of 
production and capital investment than their peers slightly over the threshold cutoff that 
classified them into performing firms. More broadly, one can also connect these mechanisms 
with the recent literature about the productivity effects of financial frictions and misallocation of 
resources across firms (Hsieh & Klenow, 2009; Gopinath, Kalemli, Karabarbounis, & Villegas-
Sánchez, 2017; García-Santana, Moral-Benito, Pijoan-Mas, & Ramos, 2016; Dörr, Raissi, & 
Weber, 2017). 
Our work is related to a number of previous studies. The relationship between monetary 
policy and bank risk-taking has been explored in Jiménez et al., 2014; Dell’Arriccia, Laeven and 
Suarez, 2017; and Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydro, 2015). However these studies do not analyze 
either the impact of the economic cycle in terms of GDP growth or the effect of bank lending 
standards on other firm quality measures different from firm credit risk such as productivity. We 
capture the effect of bank risk taking in the decision of granting a loan request over the business 
cycle, through the analysis of two firm characteristics: credit risk and productivity. In this sense, 
our paper is related to the work by Dell’Arriccia et al. (2017), who use an ex-ante measure of 
borrower’s risk instead of credit history or ex-post defaults rates. The bank-balance sheet channel 
using loan applications is also employed in Jiménez et al. (2012) but their focus is to analyze the 
impact on monetary policy on bank credit supply.  
Our paper complements the literature about the effects of monetary policy and the 
business cycle on banks’ credit supply. While previous papers cast their conclusions about 
banks’ lending standards focusing on different measures of firms’ credit risk, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no paper that studies how banks consider firms’ productivity during a 
complete business cycle when they choose their loan portfolio. Therefore, we consider how 
productivity and ex-ante firms’ credit risk affect banks’ loan granting, and to what extent banks’ 
lending policies vary over the business cycle depending on the balance-sheet strength of the 
banks.1 We thus estimate how the ability of banks to discriminate in terms of firms’ productivity 
depends on macroeconomic conditions, which allows us to relate our findings to the literature 
about misallocation of resources across firms.  
We use more than one million loan applications matched at the bank-firm level2 from 
the Credit Register of Spain (CIR). Banco de España collects this information in a monthly basis 
for those firms that are not working with the bank at the time of the loan request. Additionally, 
we match the CIR with banks’ monthly balance sheet information (collected by Banco de 
España in its role as bank supervisor) and with firms’ balance sheet data from the Spanish 
Mercantile Register collected by the Central Balance Sheet Office in the Bank of Spain. Using 
this information, we compute firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) following Levinsohn and 
Petrin, 2003) and firms’ ex ante credit risk following a Z-score procedure. Both variables 
summarize the information that banks evaluate for granting a loan to a company. Other firm 
controls included are the number of banking relationships and a set of firm fixed effects which 
                                                                          
1   In the spirit of Markowitz’ theory (Markowitz, 1952) our specifications rely on the idea that banks choose their loan 
portfolio composition considering firms’ ex- ante credit risk and productivity (that in the end are presumably correlated 
with banks’ loan portfolio credit- risk and returns). That is, banks would grant a loan to those firms with a specific mix 
of ex ante credit risk and productivity that would lead them to a loan portfolio composition with a targeted credit risk 
and returns mix. 
2   1,027,436 loan applications and 201,741 firms. 
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controls for unobserved firm heterogeneity (including demand factors). Finally, our data allow us, 
in some specifications, to use bank-time fixed effects to exhaustively control for time varying 
observable and unobservable supply factors (including the bank balance-sheet channel).  
Our main findings are as follows: higher firms’ productivity or lower credit risk 
increase the probability that a loan application is granted. This finding suggests that banks 
discriminate in terms of both productivity and ex-ante credit risk so that bank lending policies 
might play a role in the allocation of resources towards more/less productive firms. Moreover 
firm’s credit risk and productivity are substitutes in terms of their effects on bank’s screening 
process. Regarding macroeconomic fluctuations, we find that banks soften their lending 
standards during expansions: the economic cycle and the monetary policy affects lending 
standards both in terms of firms’ credit risk and productivity, i.e., when the economy is 
growing or it is in a loosen monetary policy environment, banks respond taking on more risk. 
In other words, banks screening process reduces the relative importance of productivity or 
ex-ante credit risk to the point of not taking them into accountin good times. Finally, our 
estimates indicate that these patterns are stronger in the case of less capitalized, less liquid 
and more profitable (higher risk profile) banks. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The databases and registries 
relevant to the paper are described in Section 2A. Section 2B describes in detail the variables 
we use in the regressions. Section 2C presents the empirical specifications considered in the 
paper. Section 3 discusses the estimates and how bank lending standards depend on 
macroeconomic conditions as well as bank balance-sheet strength with special emphasis  
on the role of firms’ productivity. Section 4 presents some robustness checks illustrating that 
our results are not affected by the behavior of current banks. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Data and Empirical Strategy 
In this section we first discuss the data employed in our analysis. Second, we provide the definition 
of the dependent and the independent variables. Finally, we describe the empirical strategy. 
2.1 Database 
We use confidential loan level data for Spanish non-financial companies at monthly frequency 
over the period 2002 to 2015 from the Spanish Credit Register (CIR), which is collected by the 
Banco de España acting as the national banker supervisor and regulatory authority.3 We work 
with commercial and industrial (C&I) loans granted by commercial banks, savings banks and 
credit cooperatives (what embodies almost the entire Spanish banking system) to non-financial 
publicly limited and limited liability companies (almost the 95% of all non-financial firms). 
The CIR contains very detailed loan level data since 1984 on all loan commitments 
above € 6,000 granted by any bank operating in Spain. It means that more than 600,000 firms 
and 200 banks are active in the database at any moment in time. The CIR provides some 
information about borrower, lender and detailed information about loan characteristics, such as 
the type of instrument, currency, maturity, degree of collateralization, default status, as well  
as the amount drawn by the firm.   
The information about the total current credit exposures, loan characteristics, and 
(possible) defaults is updated at a monthly frequency basis. All banks receive this information 
automatically, but only regarding their current borrowers. Therefore, they only file information 
requests following loan applications from firms that are currently not borrowing from them. 
Banks are legitimated to demand this data with the consent of their potential borrowers 
(Jiménez et al. 2012; Jiménez et al. 2014), what is considered a signal that they are seriously 
approaching to the bank to get a credit. We observe all loan applications from 2002:02 to 
2015:12 (before 2002 this information was not stored). Requests can be made at any time but 
they are collected monthly. Each request links uniquely a bank with (a potential) borrower, what 
permits us to infer which loans are granted by matching the loan application database with the 
CIR database. We match logged requests by firm i to bank b with new loans coded in the CIR 
database. For all requests lodged we observe whether the bank accepted and granted the loan 
if the new loan is coded in the CIR within three months after the information request was 
submitted by the bank (and we infer the bank rejected the loan if it is not coded).  
Although the CIR and loan application databases provide comprehensive data on 
loans, they don’t provide any additional information on borrowers but its identity, the amount 
drawn by the firm, province and sector of activity and its credits records (if any). We can also 
obtain from the CIR information about legal status, total credit amount and the number of 
banking relationships of the firm as well as the non-performing loan ratio. However, additional 
data on firms’ and banks’ balance sheets is crucial to build some key variables for our analysis, 
such as firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) and firms’ ex-ante credit risk (scoring). This 
information allows us to disentangle supply from demand factors: loan demand for each bank 
is given and observed, so each bank has in light of their potential borrowers' balance sheet 
strength. Therefore, we match CIR and the loan requests dataset with additional information 
about firms and banks balance sheets. 
                                                                          
3   The CIR was first employed by Jiménez and Saurina (2004) and Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006).  
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We have information about firm characteristics at a yearly frequency from Central 
Balance Sheet Data (CBI, Central de Balances Integrada in Spanish).4 This dataset is only 
available for researchers undertaking projects for the Banco de España and comprises data 
from the Spanish Mercantile Register (an administrative database that contains available 
information from firms financial statements required to be submitted by law to the commercial 
registry and also on their income corporate tax returns) collected by Central Balance Sheet 
Office, that is the unit in charge of collecting and cleaning these datasets within Bank of Spain. 
Additionally, we get banks’ information at a monthly frequency from banks’ balance-
sheet data owned by Banco de España in its role as banking supervisor. To capture 
macroeconomic conditions, we include the overnight interest rate and the GDP growth rate. All 
firm variables are set at the last December before the loan request is made to reduce reverse 
causality. In the same vein, banks’ and macroeconomic variables refers to the month previous 
to the loan application. 
2.2 Variables 
We use data about loan applications together with information about bank characteristics (to 
measure banks’ balance sheet strength) as well as firm characteristics. Therefore, we can 
disentangle supply from demand factors by exploiting within bank variation in credit availability 
as a function of firm characteristics during upturns and downturns. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper for the 
whole period 2002:02-2015:12. 
2.2.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOAN APPLICATION IS ACCEPTED AND THE LOAN IS GRANTED 
The dependent variable is an indicator dummy, LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED, which 
equals one if the bank b grants a loan requested by firm i at time t within the period t to t+3 and 
equals zero otherwise. The average value of loan requests granted inthe period considered is 
around 35 percent. We focus on loans granted by commercial banks, savings banks and credit 
cooperatives to nonfinancial limited liability companies. 
2.2.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
As independent variables, we include two macroeconomic indicators, namely, annual change 
of OVERNIGHT INTEREST RATE (∆IRt-1) as a measure of the monetary policy stance, and 
annual growth RATE of GDP (∆GDPt-1) as a proxy for the business cycle. In some specifications 
we substitute these macroeconomic variables by a set of time dummies. 
In order to disentangle the role of demand and supply factors, we include a set of firm 
and bank observable characteristics described below. Crucially, we also include a set of  
firm- and bank-specific fixed effects to control for demand and supply time invariant 
heterogeneity. Later, to fully account for time-varying heterogeneity in the supply side we 
saturate the specifications including a set of bank-time fixed effects.  
Regarding firm characteristics, the regressors of interest are the two variables that 
summarize the information on the firm’s quality as borrower: firm’s total factor productivity and 
                                                                          
4   Central Balance Sheet Database has been filed with Mercantile Registries since 1995. Its size has grown progressively 
since then. Over 100,000 annual account of non-financial corporation were processed in the first years, while more 
than 400,000 annual accounts of non-financial corporations are processed each year since 2004 and more than 
600,000 since 2011). In the last update, in 2015 9,086 corporations were processed from CBA and 667,585 
corporations from CBB. 
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ex-ante credit risk. These variables are calculated using information from CIR and CBI data as 
we next describe.   
Firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) is computed as the residual in a logged 
production function with three inputs (labor, capital and intermediate materials) and industry-
specific technology parameters. The industry-specific parameters of the firms’ production 
function are estimated based on Wooldridge, (2009) GMM approach to implement Olley and 
Pakes, (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin, (2003) identification strategy.5 For that purpose we 
use information on firm’s revenue, total wage bill, employment, book value of capital stock 
(both physical and intangible), expenses in intermediate goods, and sector of activity at the 
NACE 4-digit level. A cut-off of a minimum of 25 observations per sector and year is required to 
compute the input variables to estimate sector-specific parameters of the production function. 
Sectors that do not meet the minimum cut-off criterion are flagged (agriculture and mining, 
petroleum industry companies) and firm specific TFP figures are computed using the estimated 
production function parameters at the corresponding macro-sector level. A full set of year 
dummies is included to control for sector specific trends. ECB (2016) contains a detailed 
description of the methodology used here to estimate TFP at the firm level. 
Regarding the measure of ex-ante credit risk for each firm, we consider a numerical 
score (SCORING) that proxies for the firm’s probability to not fulfill its commitments with any 
bank based on lagged balance sheet information. To compute this variable we estimate a 
probability model for the whole sample where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 
one when the firm defaulted in any of the 36 following months after a loan was granted and 
zero otherwise.6 Specifically, each firm’s score is the total summation of the product between 
the regressors values and their respective coefficients in the default probability model. We use 
fifteen variables as controls based on firms’ balance sheet characteristics — financial ratios, 
financial indebtedness, solvency, liquidity, profitability, and expertise, structure, credit history 
and provincial and sectorial dummies — plus their quadratic, cubic and fourth power to assign 
a score to each company. The higher the scoring the riskier the company and therefore the 
likelihood to default. 
Additionally, we include the logarithm of the number of banks with which a company is 
indebted each period plus one, ln (NUMBER OF BANKS RELATIONSHIPS + 1) bit-1, as another 
control. It provides relevant information about the solidity of the firm-bank relationship and also, 
ceteris paribus, about the firm’s creditworthiness. Notice we are focusing on new loans, so our 
estimations are not affected by loan evergreening. Finally, to control for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity constant over time, firm fixed effects are also included in all the estimations. This 
implies that we are only working with firms that have more than one loan application during the 
period considered (96% of total observations in our data). 
Turning to banks’ characteristics, we include a set of six bank’s balance sheet variables 
to capture supply side developments. They are included in the regression lagged one period (one 
month) to avoid endogeneity concerns, as we presuppose that banks optimally take decisions 
about loan granting and capital and liquidity holdings in response to macroeconomic  
                                                                          
5   For robustness, we computed 5 alternative TFP measures: nominal TFP GMM estimation, TFP OLS estimation (we get 
two measures using alternatively real variables and nominal variables in an OLS regression), and real and nominal TFP 
estimation using industry-specific US labor shares in total production (constant returns to scale assumed in this case). 
Main results keep qualitatively the same using all the 5 alternative measures of TFP. 
6   Using alternative time horizons for firm’s underperformance (one and two years ahead) to construct our scoring variable, 
results remain qualitatively the same. Specifically we compute credit risk for a firm i at period t using three alternative sets of 
information: i) all firms’ credit history until T, (where T is the last period of observation in our data); ii) all firms’ credit history 
until t-1; and ii) firm’s credit history from the previous three years (t-19 to period t-1). Results are available upon request. 
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and monetary policy conditions. We include, the log of the total assets of the bank, ROAbt-1,  
the bank’s return on assets; LIQUIDITY RATIObt-1, liquid assets (cash and balance with central 
banks, and loans and advances to governments and credit institutions) held by the bank over 
the total assets of the bank; BANK CAPITAL RATIObt-1, the logged ratio of bank equity over 
total assets of the bank, as a measure of bank’s net worth; and the DOUBTFUL LOAN RATIObt-1. 
Additionally we include a measure of bank supply constructed following a methodology similar 
to the one proposed by (Amiti & Weinstein, (2017).7 Finally, it is worth mentioning that a set of 
bank-time fixed effects is included in our most stringent specifications to fully account for 
supply side factors beyond the ones control for that might affect banks’ ability to discriminate in 
terms of firms’ productivity and credit risk.  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions. The 
average probability of granting a loan during the period considered is around 36%, with a 
standard deviation of 0.48. It varies between 50% and 40% between 2002 and 2007, and it 
decreases afterwards reaching 33.6% in 2015. Average total factor productivity is around  
–0.091 with a standard deviation of 0.55. Its value remains stable between 2002 and 2008 
around –0.1 and then it increases. The average scoring is –1.32 with a standard deviation of 0.75, 
what implies an average predicted default probability of 0.09 for the whole period. It provides a 
likelihood to default in the future for each borrower, thus the higher its value the higher the credit 
risk of the firm. As can be seen in Figure 2 yearly average predicted default probability reached its 
local maximum in 2008 and from then onwards it monotonically decreased. 
2.3 Empirical Strategy 
The aim of the paper can be summarized by the following three questions: (1) Does higher 
firms’ productivity or lower firm’s ex-ante credit risk increase the likelihood of a loan being 
granted? Are lending standards cyclical? (2) Does banks’ assessment about firms’ quality as a 
debtor (measured in terms of productivity and ex-ante credit risk) vary over the business cycle? 
That is to say, is there a risk-taking effect? (3) Does the bank-balance sheet channel matters for 
lending policies? That is to say, does the strength of bank balance-sheet affect the way firms’ 
productivity and ex-ante credit risk vary over the cycle?  
We thus consider three alternative specifications to explore the answers to the three 
questions above. In all cases we estimate linear probability models8 at the bank-firm-month 
(loan-month) level by matching data on the loan application outcome with the relevant 
macroeconomic, bank and firm balance-sheet characteristics. 
The baseline specification tries to answer the first question and it includes firm controls 
— ex ante credit risk and productivity —9  together with the business cycle and interest rate. To 
be more concrete, we consider the following equation: 
 
                                                                          
7   We performed a weighted linear regression where the dependent variable is bank credit growth between period t to 
period t-1, over total credit granted by each bank in both periods. Bank and Firm Fixed Effects are included to identify 
the supply and demand. 
8   We estimate a linear model instead of non-linear one because it allow multi-clustering the standard errors, to avoid 
selection problems that arise in such cases and to improve the interpretability of coefficients (Chunrong & Norton, 
2003; Norton an, Wang, & Ai 2004). 
9   Firm controls -TFP and SCORING- are variables that we estimate in a first step. We afterwards include them in Equation (1) 
as regressors. Given that in this two-step procedure we estimate both regressors by linear methods, the adjustment factor 
for the resulting sampling error resembles the traditional sandwich formula that depends on the variance of the estimated 
parameters in the first step (Murphy & Topel, 1985). Since we are using hundreds of thousands of observations in our first 
step, we expect the correction factor for the second step to have a negligible effect on our second-step inferences because 
the first-step variance is close to zero (see Bai & Ng, 2006) for a formal proof of this argument in a similar context). 
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ܮ݋ܽ݊	ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊	݅ݏ	݃ݎܽ݊ݐ݁݀௕௜௧ ൌ ߚଵܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܵܥܱܴܫܰܩ௜௧ିଵ ൅ 
ߚଷܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ିଵ ൈ ܵܥܱܴܫܰܩ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚிܱܶܪܧܴ	ܨܫܴܯ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ	௕௜௧ିଵ 		൅
ߚ஻ܤܣܰܭ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ௕௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହ∆ܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߚ଺∆ܫܴ௧ିଵ ൅ ߴ௕ ൅ ௜݂ ൅ ߝ௕௜௧                           (1) 
where b refers to banks, i refers to firms, and t refers to months. Moreover, firm fixed effects, f୧, 
and bank fixed effects, ߴ௕, are included to capture time-invariant demand and supply factors. 
Our main interest relies on the coefficients for productivity (TFP) and credit risk (SCORING) to 
understand whether banks’ lending standards and credit allocation depend on these two 
factors. Finally, the interaction between credit risk and productivity informs about the degree of 
substitutability in banks’ assessments between these two firm characteristics. The coefficients 
on TFP and SCORING provide an answer to the first set of questions. The expected signs are 
β1 > 0 and β2 < 0 if banks take into account firm creditworthiness during the granting process of 
a loan request. The complementarity or substitutability between both variables is captured with 
the multiplicative term coefficient between them. If the estimated coefficient is positive it will be 
concluded that productivity and credit risk are substitutive when banks choose the firms’ in 
their loan portfolio, and complementaries in the other situation. On the other hand, it is 
expected β5 > 0 and β6 < 0 (see Jiménez et al. 2012), which would highlight the cyclical 
behavior in the credit standards of banks. 
To answer question 2 we enhance the baseline specification with interaction terms 
between firm controls (credit risk scoring and productivity) and macroeconomic characteristics 
(ΔGDP and ΔIR) to show how the cycle drives banks’ lending policies and its compositional 
effects on banks’ loan portfolio through the demand side. In particular, we consider the 
following model:  
ܮ݋ܽ݊	ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊	݅ݏ	݃ݎܽ݊ݐ݁݀௕௜௧ ൌ 
ൌ ߚଵܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܵܥܱܴܫܰܩ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ିଵ ൈ ܵܥܱܴܫܰܩ௜௧ିଵଶ
൅ ߚிܱܶܪܧܴ	ܨܫܴܯ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥ ௜ܵ௧ିଵଶ
൅ ߚ஻ܤܣܰܭ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ௕௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ௖ܯܣܥܴܱ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ	௧ିଵ 
൅ߴ௕ ൅ ௜݂	
൅ߚ଻ ൬ ܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ିଵܵܥܱܴܫܰܩ௜௧ିଵ൰ ൈ ܯܣܥܴܱ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ	௧ିଵ 
൅	ߚ଼ܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ିଵ ൈ ܵܥܱܴܫܰܩ௜௧ିଵ ൈ ܯܣܥܴܱ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ	௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௕௜௧                        (2) 
The coefficients on the cross-effects give answer to the second question about the 
compositional effects of the cyclicality of bank lending standards. On the one hand, we expect 
to have β7 > 0 for the interactions TFP*∆ܫܴ and SCORING*∆ܩܦܲ and β7 < 0 for the interactions 
TFP*∆ܩܦܲ and SCORING*∆ܫܴ. This would imply that banks increase their appetite for risk, 
softening their lending standards, when the economy is growing or during times of loose 
monetary policy. 
Turning to the third specification, we add triple interaction terms between firms’ 
variables, macroeconomic variables and banks characteristics, to test whether the cyclicality of 
the lending policy of the banks depends on the strength of their balance sheets. More 
specifically, in order to analyze how bank lending standards variation is related with bank 
characteristics, we enlarge specification (2) and estimate the following specification:   
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ܮ݋ܽ݊	ܽ݌݌݈݅ܿܽݐ݅݋݊	݅ݏ	݃ݎܽ݊ݐ݁݀௕௜௧ = 
ൌ ߚଵܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߚଶܵܥܱܴܫܰܩ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ିଵൈ ܵܥܱܴܫܰܩ௜௧ିଵଶ	൅ߚସܱܶܪܧ	ܴ	ܨܫܴܯ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ	௜௧ିଵ	൅ߚ஻ܤܣܰܭ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ	௕,௧ିଵ 	൅ ߚ஼ܯܣܥܴܱ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ	௧ିଵ 
൅ߴ௕ ൅ ௜݂ +	ߚ଻ 	൬ ܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ିଵܵܥܱܴܫܰܩ௜௧ିଵ൰ ൈ ܯܣܥܴܱ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ	௧ିଵ 
൅ߚ଼ܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ିଵ ൈ ܵܥܱܴܫܰܩ௜௧ିଵ ൈ ܯܣܥܴܱ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ	௧ିଵ	൅ߚ஻௖௚ܤܣܰܭ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ	௕,௧ିଵ ൈ ܯܣܥܴܱ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ	௧ିଵ 
൅	ߚ஻௖ଵܤܣܰܭ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ	௕,௧ିଵ ൈ ൬ ܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ିଵܵܥܱܴܫܰܩ௜௧ିଵ൰  
൅	ߚ஻௖௦ܤܣܰܭ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ	௕,௧ିଵ ൈ ൬ ܶܨ ௜ܲ௧ିଵܵܥܱܴܫܰܩ௜௧ିଵ൰ ൈܯܣܥܴܱ	ܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ	௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௕௜௧                                               (3) 
 
The coefficients ߚ஻௖ଵand ߚ஻௖ଶ provide information about the variation in lending 
standards associated with banks’ balance sheet characteristics to investigate whether the pro-
cyclicality in bank lending policies is more marked in certain type of banks. 
Finally, it is worth highlighting that in all the three specifications we consider a final 
version of the models in which we substitute bank variables and bank fixed effects by a set of 
bank-time fixed effects (ߴ௕௧) to better identify supply factors beyond banks’ lending standards 
in terms of firms productivity and credit risk. 
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3 Results 
Table 2 reports the estimates of the baseline specification, which aims to answer the question: 
Does higher firms’ productivity or lower firms’ ex-ante credit risk increase the likelihood of a 
loan being granted? Does the loan granting probability depend on the economic cycle? We 
answer these two questions looking at column (1) of Table 1, where our variables of interest 
(TFP and SCORING) are included. Macroeconomic conditions are controlled using the GDP 
growth and the change in interest rate. In addition, a set of bank controls is also included to 
account for differences in time-varying fluctuations in the supply side. Unobserved time-
invariant firm and bank heterogeneity are controlled through the inclusion of firm and bank fixed 
effects in the demand and supply side. The estimated model in column (2) includes the 
interaction term	TFP୧୲ିଵ ∗ SCORING୧୲ିଵ, which captures the potential complementarities 
between productivity and credit risk in the loan granting decision process.10 Finally, in column 
(3) we substitute the bank fixed effects, the bank balance-sheet variables and the 
macroeconomic indicators by a set of bank-time dummies. This saturated specification allows 
us to identify the coefficients by exploiting variation across firms within the same month and 
bank in order to isolate the role of firms’ productivity and ex-ante credit risk while controlling for 
time-varying supply factors. 
According to the estimates in Table 2, an increase from 25th to 75th percentile in firm’s 
total factor productivity rises the probability of loan granting in around 1.302 pp.,11 while an 
increase from 25th to 75th percentile in firm’s credit risk scoring reduces the probability of loan 
granting by 0.986 pp.12 These effects are significant not only statistically but also economically. 
In particular, the TFP effect increases in 3.7% of the average loan granting probability  
(see Table 1) and the corresponding credit risk effect is –2.8%. Both effects are fairly stable 
across all the three specifications considered in Table 2. We therefore conclude that both 
dimensions are relevant in the banks’ decision of loan granting. 
The interaction coefficient in columns (2) and (3) can be interpreted in terms of 
substitutability or complementarity between the two firms’ characteristics considered. Given 
the estimated coefficients, we conclude that firm’s ex-ante credit risk and productivity are 
substitutes in terms of their effects on the banks’ credit granting process. In particular, this 
result implies, for instance, that the importance of the ex-ante credit risk of the firm in the 
granting decision is lower among highly productive firms.  
Columns (1) to (3) also show that higher interest rates or lower GDP growth contract 
credit availability, which reflects the cyclicality of lending standards of banks. 
Turning to the next question (Does banks’ assessment about firms’ quality as a debtor 
vary over the business cycle?), we gradually saturate the baseline specification by adding 
interaction terms to see how banks frame their lending policies over the cycle in response to 
loans applicants’ productivity and ex-ante credit risk. Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients 
for the specification in Model 2. In column (1) we only add an interaction term between firms’ 
productivity and macroeconomic variables. In column (2) we only consider an interaction 
between firms’ ex-ante credit risk and the macroeconomic variables. In column (3) we include 
                                                                          
10   All variables are demeaned to keep the economic sense of all the variables in levels. 
11   2.1*(0.219 – (–0.401)). 
12   1.4*(–0.871 – (1.575)). 
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both firms’ TFP and SCORING interacted with macroeconomic variables. The specification in 
column (4) also includes two triple interactions between TFP, SCORING and the two 
macroeconomic indicators to test whether the substitutability pattern identified above varies 
with aggregate macroeconomic conditions. All specifications from columns (1) to (4) include 
firm and bank fixed effects. As a robustness check, in column (5) we include a set of time fixed 
effects while in column (6) a set of bank-time fixed effects is included instead of the macro and 
bank variables. In both columns (5) and (6), the results remain virtually unaltered with respect to 
those of column (4) where macroeconomic and bank variables are included as controls instead 
of time and bank-time fixed effects. 
The main conclusion from the estimates reported in Table 3 is that bank lending 
standards vary with macroeconomic conditions. This is so because the interaction terms of firm 
characteristics with macroeconomic variables are statistically significant in most cases. In 
particular, we estimate a negative (positive) coefficient for the interaction of TFP with GDP 
growth rate (ΔIR), and a positive (negative) coefficient for the interaction of SCORING with  
GDP growth (ΔIR). These findings indicate that during the expansionary phases of the cycle 
banks soften their lending standards implicitly increasing the risk in their loan portfolios, while 
they tighten lending standards during downturns so that the implicit credit risk assumed by 
banks is reduced. When TFP is interacted with the annual change in the overnight interest rate 
its coefficient is statistically significant, which can be interpreted as evidence of the impact of 
monetary policy in the loan portfolio composition in terms of productivity.13 Summing up, both 
economic cycle and monetary policy appear to have a compositional effect on banks’ loan 
portfolios. The former would affect loan portfolios both in terms of credit risk and productivity of 
the borrowers, while the latter would only change the loan portfolio composition in terms  
of firms’ credit risk. 
Turning to the economic significance of the estimated effects in column (4) of Table 3, 
a one percentage point increase in the GDP growth rate reduces the positive effect of firms’ 
productivity on the probability of being granted a loan around 33% (from 0.022 to 0.015). On 
the other hand, a one percentage point increase in the GDP growth rate would reduce the 
negative effect of ex-ante credit risk on the loan granting probability in 35% (from –0.013 to  
–0.008). It is worth highlighting that the positive effect of firms’ TFP on loan granting probability 
vanishes when annual GDP growth is above 3.2%, the 75th percentile in the sample. These 
effects remain very similar when we control for time or bank-time fixed effects in columns (5) 
and (6). Finally, the lack of statistical significance of the triple interaction terms 
(TFP*SCORING*∆ܩܦܲ and TFP*SCORING*∆ܫܴ) suggests that the substitutability between 
credit risk and productivity discussed above does not vary with macroeconomic conditions. 
Finally, we are also interested in how banks’ lending policies vary with macroeconomic 
conditions depending on their balance sheet strength. In particular, we aim to answer the 
question: Do different banks account for firms’ productivity and credit risk differently over the 
business cycle?. 
Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates for the triple interaction terms of firm 
characteristics (TFP and SCORING) with bank characteristics (ROA, LIQUIDITY, BANK 
CAPITAL RATIO…) and macroeconomic variables (GDP and INTEREST RATE), which 
correspond to the parameters ߚ஻௖ଵ௦, 	ߚ஻௖ଶ௦, ߚ஻௖ଵ௣, ߚ஻௖ଵ௣ in specification (3) above.14  
                                                                          
13  Only when firm fixed effects and bank-time fixed effects are included the coefficient for the interaction of TFP and annual  
overnight interest growth rate is marginally significant (p-value of 0.12), although it’s economic impact is almost unaltered. 
14  Other bank balance sheet variables are also included as controls in the regressions reported in Table 4 together with 
all the remaining controls considered in equation (3).  
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These coefficients would capture heterogeneous changes in banks’ lending standards over the 
cycle as a function of banks’ balance sheet characteristics. To be more concrete, we focus on 
three variables that reflect banks’ balance sheet strength, bank’s liquidity, banks net worth, and 
banks’ return on assets. The last variable can be understood as a proxy of banks’ internal 
efficiency and as a measure of their risk appetite, in the sense that higher risk portfolios usually led 
to higher returns on assets. Column (1) includes firm, bank, and time fixed effects while column (2) 
includes bank-time fixed effects and firms’ fixed effects instead of bank and time fixed effects 
separately. In a few words, the estimated results indicate that less capitalized, less liquid and the 
more profitable banks are those that soften the more their credit standards during upturns, 
especially in the case of firms’ ex-ante credit risk. These results are robust to the consideration of 
different configurations of bank- and time- fixed effects, and highlight the need to design 
regulatory frameworks which lead banks to adequate capitalization and liquidity management, 
easing the evolution of the banking business to an environment where the basis for banks 
profitability to be an adequate creditor risk assessment, regardless the business cycle.  
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4 Robustness: Credit substitution mechanisms 
Our loan application database excludes loan requests from firms to their current banks, i.e. loan 
applications for firm-bank pairs that already have a current banking relationship are not included in 
our sample. This is so because banks only process information requests for firms that are not 
borrowing from them because they automatically receive every month information about their 
current borrowers’ credit exposure. In this section we investigate whether this sample selection is 
biasing our results. In other words, we want to analyze whether firms are able to substitute credit 
with their current lenders, and to offset changes in credit standards over the cycle by resorting to 
their current banks. We check for the potential effect of this substitution mechanism by means of 
two different exercises: i) we first condition the analysis on firms that did not have any bank 
relationship in the previous period, and therefore cannot substitute credit, and, ii) indirectly, we 
also analyze whether a firm gets a loan from any bank (including its current lenders) given that the 
firm has at least one loan application to non-current banks. 
Table 5 reports the results of these two exercises. Column 1 includes an additional 
main bank fixed effect in an attempt to control for the possible impact of the main current bank 
on our results. In Colum 2 we restrict the sample to those firms that don’t have any credit 
exposures in the previous period. From Column 3 onwards we check by an indirect procedure 
the credit substitution mechanisms effect. We regress our explanatory variables on an indicator 
that takes value one if the firm gets a bank loan from any bank (including its current lender) and 
zero otherwise. For this specification the number of observations decrease because we 
collapse our main dataset at firm-time level. Column 3 reports baseline estimates and Column 4 
adds an additional main bank fixed effect.  
In all cases, estimates are fairly robust and remain virtually unaltered with respect to 
our baseline results in Table 3. We thus conclude that firms are not able to substitute credit 
and that sample selection in our loan applications database is not a source of concern.  
4.1 Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the loan portfolio 
composition of Spanish banks. In particular, we analyze whether bank lending policies are 
influenced by the business cycle or the monetary policy stance. We consider two variables at 
the firm level that summarize banks’ loan portfolio characteristics and that can be interpreted 
as proxies for firms’ quality as debtors: firms’ ex ante credit risk and firms’ total factor 
productivity. While the former measures firms’ future loan default default probability, the latter 
measures firms’ allocative efficiency in production. 
From our knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes explicitly the role played by 
firms’ productivity when banks assess loan applications. We study whether banks soften their 
credit standards during booms to tighten them during busts and show how the economic cycle 
and monetary policy change the appetite for risk of banks. During upturns (or episodes of loose 
monetary policy) banks soften their lending standards and firms with higher credit risk and 
lower productivity have a higher probability of being granted a loan than during recessions  
(or episodes of tight monetary policy).  
This cyclicality in lending standards is more pronounced among less capitalized, less 
liquid, and more profitable banks. In this sense, changes in capital, liquidity and systemic 
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banks’ regulation introduced by Basel III with the aim of reinforcing the financial stability, 
improve bank management and strengthen banks’ transparency, would also smooth banks’ 
lending-standards-cyclicality according to our results. Thus, leading to an allocation of credit 
better aligned with firms’ productivity and credit risk in the current juncture.  
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Figure 1. Credit, investment and TFP in Spain 
 
Notes. Credit refers to bank credit to non-financial corporations taken from Banco de España 
and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is sourced from (Cuadrado & Moral-Benito, 2016). 
Figure 2. Average predicted firm’s defaulted probability 
 
Notes. Own calculations, from a linear probability model that provides a score for each 
borrower. The score is the total summation of the product between the repressors and their 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Notes: Table 1 reports means, standard deviations, first, second and third quartiles and 
maximum values for the variables considered in the analysis. The number of firms is 179,200 




Mean Sd Median 25 pth 75 pth Max
        LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTEDibt 0.356 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
   Macroeconomic conditions (t)
Mean Sd Median 25 pth 75 pth Max
         ΔGDPt 0.775 2.596 0.614 -1.673 3.262 4.176
         ΔIRt -0.279 1.183 -0.023 -0.740 0.443 1.407
   Firm characteristics (i)
Mean Sd Median 25 pth 75 pth Max
         TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITYi,t-1 -0.091 0.550 -0.092 -0.401 0.219 1.744
         SCORINGi,t-1 -1.312 0.745 -1.170 -1.575 -0.871 1.241
         ln(NUMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS)ibt-1 1.426 0.543 1.386 1.099 1.792 2.890
    Bank characteristics (b)
Mean Sd Median 25pth 75pth Max
         ln(TOTAL ASSETS)b,t-1 17.801 1.488 17.939 16.890 18.883 20.066
         ln(LIQUIDITY RATIO)b, t-1 14.755 6.607 13.929 10.210 17.810 43.229
         ROAb,t-1 0.573 0.657 0.601 0.331 0.871 2.872
         ln(BANK CAPITAL RATIO)b,t-1 -2.896 0.435 -2.912 -3.114 -2.650 -1.984
         DOUBTFUL LOAN RATIO b,t-1 5.243 5.145 4.058 0.855 7.255 22.625
         SUPPLY SHOCKbt 0.140 0.211 0.085 0.017 0.239 1.975
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Table 2. Baseline specification: Lending Standards over the Credit Cycle 
 
Notes: The table reports estimates from our baseline specification. Column 2 adds the 
interaction for the firms' quality variables to capture differences in the slope for the probability of 
loan granting to allocative efficiency for firms with a certain level of risk. Bank covariates 
(SUPPLYbt; TOTAL ASSETSbt; LIQUIDITY RATIObt; ROAbt; BANK CAPITAL RATIObt; 
DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIObt) are also included but their coefficients are not reported. We 
report standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable we use is a binary indicator that 
takes the value 1 if loan is granted by bank b to firm i in period t, and zero otherwise. See Table 
A.1 for the definition of the variables. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars 
denotes significance at the 5% level and three stars denotes significance at the 1% percent 











PRODUCTIVITYit-1 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SCORINGit-1 -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)








Observations 921,637 921,637 921,672
Firms 179,200 179,200 179203
Banks 174 174 174
R-squared 0.289 0.289 0.290
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES
Bank Fixed Effect YES YES YES
Firm-Time Fixed effect NO NO YES
Time periods, months 167 167 167
Dependent variable: Loan Granted ibt=1  if the bank b grants a loan requested by firm i at time t within the 
period t to t+3, and equals zero otherwise
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Table 3. Analyzing Compositional Effects of the cyclicality of lending standards:  
Bank-risk Taking 
 
Notes: Table 3 reports estimates that enhance specification in Table 2 by adding interaction 
terms for the firms’ quality and macroeconomic variables to capture differences in the slope for 
the probability of loan granting over the cycle. Bank covariates (SUPPLYbt; TOTAL ASSETSbt; 
LIQUIDITY RATIObt; ROAbt; BANK CAPITAL RATIObt; DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIObt) are also 
included but their coefficients are not reported here.  Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
The dependent variable we use is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if loan is granted by 
bank b to firm i in period t, and zero otherwise. See Table A.1 for the definition of the variables. 
Scoring is defined as a measure of ex- ante risk that recaps firm's predicted probability of 
default in any of the 36 following months after a loan granted. Fifteen variables based on firms' 
financial ratios, balance sheet characteristics (financial indebtedness, solvency, liquidity, 
profitability, and expertise), structure and credit history plus its quadratic, cubic and fourth 
power are the set of information to compute the numerical value for the scoring. See Table A.1 
for the definition of the variables. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars 
denotes significance at the 5% level and three stars denotes significance at the 1% percent 







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PRODUCTIVITYit-1 0.022*** 0.0209*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SCORINGit-1 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆GDPt-1 0.0217*** 0.0216*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆INTEREST RATEt-1 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
PRODUCTIVITYit-1*SCORINGit-1 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PRODUCTIVITYit-1*∆GDPt-1 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PRODUCTIVITY it-1*∆INTEREST RATEt-1 0.003** 0.003* 0.003* 0.003 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SCORINGit-1*ln(∆GDP)t-1 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SCORINGit-1*∆INTEREST RATEt-1 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PRODUCTIVITYit-1*SCORINGit-1*∆GDPt-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PRODUCTIVITYit-1*SCORINGit-1*∆INTEREST RATEt-1 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 921,637 921,637 921,637 921,637 921,637 921,287
Firms 179,200 179,200 179,200 179,200 179,200 179145
Banks 174 174 174 174 174 173
R-squared 0.289 0.289 0.289 0.289 0.292 0.313
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES NO
Time Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO YES NO
Bank-time fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO YES
Time periods, months 167 167 167 167 167 167
Dependent variable: Loan Granted ibt=1  if the bank b grants a loan requested by firm i at time t within the period t to t+3, 
and equals zero otherwise
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Table 4. Heterogeneous lending standards over the credit cycle by type of bank 
 
Notes: The table reports estimates that enhance specification in Table 3, by adding interaction 
terms for the firms’ quality variables with banks and macroeconomic variables to capture 
cyclical fluctuations in the slopes that would reveal a heterogeneous change in banks’ lending 
standards over the cycle. Productivity, Scoring, Bank covariates (SUPPLYbt;TOTAL ASSETSbt; 
LIQUIDITY RATIObt; ROAbt; BANK CAPITAL RATIObt; DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIObt) and all the 
double and triple interactions between and macroeconomic variables are included as a controls 
although not reported here.  Standard errors are in brackets. The dependent variable is a 
binary indicator that takes the value 1 if loan is granted by bank b to firm i in period t, and zero 
otherwise. Scoring is defined as a measure of ex- ante risk that recaps firm's predicted 
probability of default in any of the 36 following months after a loan is granted. Fifteen variables 
(firms' financial ratios, balance sheet characteristics such as financial indebtedness, solvency, 
liquidity, profitability, and expertise, firms’ structure and credit history plus its quadratic, cubic 
and fourth power are the set of information used to compute the numerical value for the 
scoring. See Table A.1 for the definition of the variables. One star denotes significance at the 
10% level, two stars denotes significance at the 5% level and three stars denotes significance 
at the 1% percent level. For the definition of the variables see Appendix. 
 
(1) (2)




PRODUCTIVITYit-1*∆GDPt-1*BANK CAPITAL RATIObt-1 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.001)




SCORINGit-1*∆GDPt-1*BANK CAPITAL RATIObt-1 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
PRODUCTIVITYit-1*∆INTEREST RATEt-1*LIQUIDITY RATIObt-1 -0.001** -0.0004
(0.000) (0.000)
PRODUCTIVITYit-1*∆INTEREST RATEt-1*ROAbt-1 -0.00038 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
PRODUCTIVITYit-1*∆INTEREST RATEt-1*BANK CAPITAL RATIObt-1 -0.00478 -0.007
(0.004) (0.004)
SCORINGit-1*∆INTEREST RATEt-1*LIQUIDITY RATIObt-1 0.0004* 0.0003
(0.000) (0.000)
SCORINGit-1*∆INTEREST RATEt-1*ROAbt-1 -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.004) (0.003)






Firm Fixed Effect YES YES
Bank Fixed Effect YES NO
Time Fixed Effect YES NO
Bank and Time Fixed Effect NO YES
Time periods, months 167 167
Dependent variable: Loan Grantedibt=1  if the bank b grants a loan requested by firm i at time t within the period t to 
t+3, and equals zero otherwise
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Table 5. Robustness, credit substitution effects 
 
Note: Table 5 reports robustness checks regarding previous estimates. Bank covariates 
(SUPPLYbt; TOTAL ASSETSbt; LIQUIDITY RATIObt; ROAbt; BANK CAPITAL RATIObt; 
DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIObt) are also included but their coefficients are not reported here.  
Standard errors are reported in brackets. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is a 
binary indicator that takes the value 1 if loan is granted by bank b to firm i within the period t 
and t+3, and zero otherwise. Columns 2 reports estimates for the subsample of firms with zero 
bank relationships in the previous period. The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 is a 
binary indicator that takes the value 1 if loan is granted by bank b (new or current) to firm i 
within the period t and t+3 and zero otherwise. Columns 1 to 3 reports estimates at bank-firm-
time level.Column 4 reports estimates at firm-time level. See Table A.1 for the definition of 
variables. Scoring is defined as a measure of ex- ante risk that recaps firm's predicted 
probability of default in any of the 36 following months after a loan granted. Fifteen variables 
based on firms' financial ratios, balance sheet characteristics (financial indebtedness, solvency, 
liquidity, profitability, and expertise), structure and credit history plus its quadratic, cubic and 
fourth power are the set of information to compute the numerical value for the scoring. See 
Table A.1 for the definition of the variables. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two 
stars denotes significance at the 5% level and three stars denotes significance at the 1% 
percent level. For the definition of the variables see Appendix. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
(If a Loan is Granted  by a firm i by a bank b within the period t to t+3)=1,  
zero otherwise
PRODUCTIVITYit-1 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SCORINGit-1 -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.033*** -0.034***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln (BANK RELATIONSHIPS+1)it-1 -0.130*** -0.132*** -0.126*** -0.129***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
∆GDPt-1 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.030*** 0.030***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
∆INTEREST RATEt-1 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
PRODUCTIVITYit-1*SCORINGit-1 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
PRODUCTIVITYit-1*∆GDPt-1 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PRODUCTIVITY it-1*∆INTEREST RATEt-1 0.003* 0.003* 0.004** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SCORINGit-1*ln(∆GDP)t-1 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SCORINGit-1*∆INTEREST RATEt-1 -0.003** -0.003* -0.005** -0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 911,967 793,363 834,372 834,360
R-squared 0.289 0.306 0.356 0.359
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Bank Fixed Effect YES YES NO NO
Main Bank Fixed Effect YES NO NO YES
Time Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO
Bank-time fixed effect NO NO NO NO
Firms 176,770 173,727 171,353 171,350
Banks 174 171 - -
Time periods, months 167 167 167 167
Sample restricted (Banks relationshipst-1=0) NO YES NO NO
A (new or current) bankA new bank 




Variable Name Unit Definition
Dependent variables
                    I(GRANTING OF LOAN APPLICATIONS) tbi %
Independent variables
     Firm characteristics
                     PRODUCTIVITYit 0.0x%
                     SCORINGit 1
                     ln (BANK RELATIONSHIPS+1)it 0.0x%
      Macroeconomic conditions
                     ∆GDPt-1 %
                     ∆INTEREST RATEt-1 % Annual change of overnight interbank interest rate at t-1
      Bank characteristics
                    Total Assetst 0.0x%
                      ROAt 0.0x%
                      Liquidity ratiot 0.0x%
                      Ln(Bank capital ratio)t 0.0x%
                      Doubtful loans ratiot 0.0x%
                      Supply shockt 0.0x% Difference in the residuals of two weighted linear regressions where the dependent variable is the bank credit growth from period t and period t=0 (January 2002), over total credit 
granted by each bank in t=0 and t, where the former includes  firms fixed effects and the latter firms and banks fixed effects
A dummy variable, which equals 1 if the loan application made in month t to bank b  by firm i is successful and the loan is granted in t to t+3, and equals cero otherwise.
Total Factor Productivity (TFP), computed as the residual in a production function, where output is measured as real value added and three inputs are considered (labor, capital 
and intermediate materials
Firm’s likelihood to fulfill her commitments with any bank based on lagged balance sheet information: financial ratios, financial indebtedness, solvency, liquidity, profitability, and 
expertise, structure, credit history and provincial and sectorial dummies,plus their quadratic, cubic and fourth power 
Log of the total assets in euros of the bank
Banks' return on assets: ratio of profit before taxes over banks' average total assets
The ratio of liquid assets that the bank holds over total assets of the bank
The logged ratio of equity over bank total assets
Ratio of doubtful loans over total loans
Log of the number of loans that a firm holds with a bank each period plus one,
Annual growth of rate of Spanish gross domestic product in real terms at t-1
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS 
WORKING PAPERS  
1701  JAVIER ANDRÉS, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and JUAN A. ROJAS: Implicit public debt thresholds: an empirical exercise 
for the case of Spain.
1702  LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ: Business cycle estimation with high-pass and band-pass local polynomial regression.
1703  ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO, PAUL ALLISON and RICHARD WILLIAMS: Dynamic panel data modelling using maximum 
likelihood: an alternative to Arellano-Bond.
1704  MIKEL BEDAYO: Creating associations as a substitute for direct bank credit. Evidence from Belgium.
1705  MARÍA DOLORES GADEA-RIVAS, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS and DANILO LEIVA-LEON: The evolution of regional 
economic interlinkages in Europe.
1706  ESTEBAN GARCÍA-MIRALLES: The crucial role of social welfare criteria for optimal inheritance taxation.
1707  MÓNICA CORREA-LÓPEZ and RAFAEL DOMÉNECH: Service regulations, input prices and export volumes: evidence 
from a panel of manufacturing fi rms.
1708  MARÍA DOLORES GADEA, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS and GABRIEL PÉREZ-QUIRÓS: Dissecting US recoveries.
1709  CARLOS SANZ: Direct democracy and government size: evidence from Spain.
1710  HENRIQUE S. BASSO and JAMES COSTAIN: Fiscal delegation in a monetary union: instrument assignment 
and stabilization properties.
1711 IVÁN KATARYNIUK and JAIME MARTÍNEZ-MARTÍN: TFP growth and commodity prices in emerging economies.
1712  SEBASTIAN GECHERT, CHRISTOPH PAETZ and PALOMA VILLANUEVA: Top-down vs. bottom-up? Reconciling 
the effects of tax and transfer shocks on output.
1713  KNUT ARE AASTVEIT, FRANCESCO FURLANETTO and FRANCESCA LORIA: Has the Fed responded to house 
and stock prices? A time-varying analysis.
1714  FÁTIMA HERRANZ GONZÁLEZ and CARMEN MARTÍNEZ-CARRASCAL: The impact of fi rms’ fi nancial position on 
fi xed investment and employment. An analysis for Spain.
1715  SERGIO MAYORDOMO, ANTONIO MORENO, STEVEN ONGENA and MARÍA RODRÍGUEZ-MORENO: “Keeping it 
personal” or “getting real”? On the drivers and effectiveness of personal versus real loan guarantees.
1716  FRANCESCO FURLANETTO and ØRJAN ROBSTAD: Immigration and the macroeconomy: some new empirical evidence.
1717  ALBERTO FUERTES: Exchange rate regime and external adjustment: an empirical investigation for the U.S.
1718  CRISTINA GUILLAMÓN, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and SERGIO PUENTE: High growth fi rms in employment and 
productivity: dynamic interactions and the role of fi nancial constraints.
1719  PAULO SOARES ESTEVES and ELVIRA PRADES: On domestic demand and export performance in the euro area 
countries: does export concentration matter?
1720  LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ and ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS: A menu on output gap estimation methods.
1721  PAULA GIL, FRANCISCO MARTÍ, JAVIER J. PÉREZ, ROBERTO RAMOS and RICHARD MORRIS: The output effects 
of tax changes: narrative evidence from Spain.
1722  RICARDO GIMENO and ALFREDO IBÁÑEZ: The eurozone (expected) infl ation: an option’s eyes view.
1723  MIGUEL ANTÓN, SERGIO MAYORDOMO and MARÍA RODRÍGUEZ-MORENO: Dealing with dealers: sovereign 
CDS comovements.
1724  JOSÉ MANUEL MONTERO: Pricing decisions under fi nancial frictions: evidence from the WDN survey.
1725 MARIO ALLOZA: The impact of taxes on income mobility.
1726  DANILO LEIVA-LEON: Measuring business cycles intra-synchronization in US: a regime-switching interdependence 
framework.
1727  PIERRE GUÉRIN and DANILO LEIVA-LEON: Model averaging in Markov-Switching models: predicting national 
recessions with regional data .
1728  MÁXIMO CAMACHO and DANILO LEIVA-LEON: The propagation of industrial business cycles.
1729  JAMES COSTAIN: Costly decisions and sequential bargaining.
1730  MARIO ALLOZA: Is fi scal policy more effective in uncertain times or during recessions?
1731 PIERRE GUÉRIN and DANILO LEIVA-LEON: Monetary policy, stock market and sectoral comovement. 
1732  HENRIK JENSEN, IVAN PETRELLA, SØREN HOVE RAVN and EMILIANO SANTORO: Leverage and deepening 
business cycle skewness.
1733  CÉSAR MARTÍN MACHUCA: External stress early warning indicators.
1734  RODOLFO G. CAMPOS: International migration pressures in the long run.
1735  ANDREA ARIU, ELENA BIEWEN, SVEN BLANK, GUILLAUME GAULIER, MARÍA JESÚS GONZÁLEZ, PHILIPP MEINEN, 
DANIEL MIRZA, CÉSAR MARTÍN MACHUCA and PATRY TELLO: Firm heterogeneity and aggregate business services 
exports: micro evidence from Belgium, France, Germany and Spain.
1736  LEONARDO GAMBACORTA, STEFANO SCHIAFFI and ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL: Changing business models in 
international bank funding.
1737  ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and FRANCESCA VIANI: An anatomy of the Spanish current account adjustment: the role 
of permanent and transitory factors.
1738  MARÍA J. NIETO and LARRY D. WALL: Cross-border banking on the two sides of the Atlantic: does it have an impact 
on bank crisis management?
1739  JACOPO TIMINI: Currency unions and heterogeneous trade effects: the case of the Latin Monetary Union.
1740  PAULINO FONT, MARIO IZQUIERDO and SERGIO PUENTE: Subsidising mature age employment or throwing coins 
into a wishing well: a quasi-experimental analysis.
1741  THOMAS FUJIWARA and CARLOS SANZ: Norms in bargaining: evidence from government formation in Spain.
1742  ENRIQUE ALBEROLA, ÁNGEL ESTRADA and FRANCESCA VIANI: Global imbalances from a stock perspective.
1743  ÓSCAR ARCE, RICARDO GIMENO and SERGIO MAYORDOMO: Making room for the needy: the credit-reallocation 
effects of the ECB’s corporate QE.
1744  M. D. GADEA-RIVAS, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS and EDUARDO BANDRÉS: Clustering regional business cycles.
1745  NEZIH GUNER, YULIYA KULIKOVA and JOAN LLULL: Marriage and health: selection, protection, and assortative mating.
1746  SERGIO MAYORDOMO and MARÍA RODRÍGUEZ-MORENO: Did the bank capital relief induced by the supporting 
factor enhance SME lending?
1747  KATALIN BODNÁR, LUDMILA FADEJEVA, MARCO HOEBERICHTS, MARIO IZQUIERDO PEINADO, CHRISTOPHE 
JADEAU and ELIANA VIVIANO: Credit shocks and the European Labour market.
1748  PIERRE GUÉRIN, DANILO LEIVA-LEON and MASSIMILIANO MARCELLINO: Markov-switching three-pass 
regression fi lter.
1749 ISABEL ARGIMÓN: Decentralized multinational banks and risk taking: the Spanish experience in the crisis.
1750 BING XU: Permissible collateral and access to finance: evidence from a quasi-natural experiment.
1751 GERGELY AKOS GANICS: Optimal density forecast combinations.
1801  OLYMPIA BOVER, LAURA HOSPIDO and ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: The impact of high school financial education on 
financial knowledge and choices: evidence from a randomized trial in Spain.
1802  IGNACIO HERNANDO, IRENE PABLOS, DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA and JAVIER VALLÉS: Private Saving. New Cross-
Country Evidence Based on Bayesian Techniques.
1803  PABLO AGUILAR and JESÚS VÁZQUEZ: Term structure and real-time learning.
1804  MORITZ A. ROTH: International co-movements in recessions.
1805  ANGELA ABBATE and DOMINIK THALER: Monetary policy and the asset risk-taking channel.
1806  PABLO MARTÍN-ACEÑA: Money in Spain. New historical statistics. 1830-1998.
1807  GUILHERME BANDEIRA: Fiscal transfers in a monetary union with sovereign risk.
1808  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA GÓMEZ: Credit constraints, fi rm investment and growth: evidence from survey data.
1809  LAURA ALFARO, MANUEL GARCÍA-SANTANA and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: On the direct and indirect real 
effects of credit supply shocks.
1810  ROBERTO RAMOS and CARLOS SANZ: Backing the incumbent in diffi cult times: the electoral impact of wildfi res.
1811  GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and RAQUEL VEGAS: Bank lending standards over the cycle: 
the role of fi rms’ productivity and credit risk.
Unidad de Servicios Auxiliares
Alcalá, 48 - 28014 Madrid
E-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
